3.127 Fall and Rise of China: The Fourth encirclement campaign

Last time we spoke about the first encirclement campaign against the CCP. The Jiangxi Soviet expanded despite opposition, but urban uprisings struggled, with labor union support declining. Li Lisan pushed for urban revolts, while Mao Zedong favored rural expansion. In 1930, failed attacks on Nanchang and Changsha deepened the divide between their strategies. Mao's forces later captured Ji’an, but tensions led to purges, including the Futian Incident. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Army launched an encirclement campaign. Mao’s strategy of “luring the enemy in deep” ultimately positioned the CCP for survival and future success. The NRA exploited internal conflict among the Reds, launching attacks on Donggu. Miscommunication led to friendly fire between NRA divisions. Despite capturing towns, overextension weakened the NRA, allowing the Red Army to counterattack. Through guerrilla tactics and local support, the Reds encircled and decimated multiple NRA divisions, capturing thousands of prisoners and weapons. Mao Zedong's strategies proved effective, bolstering Red Army morale and influence. By the end of the third campaign, the Jiangxi Soviet had expanded significantly.   #127 The fourth encirclement campaign  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The CCP had just survived 3 brutal encirclement campaigns in 1931, collectively known as the First Encirclement Campaign. The Reds were quite lucky in 1931, for China had major problems requiring Chiang Kai-Sheks attention. Understandably one of those major problems was a full blown Japanese invasion of Manchuria, that rest assured we will tackle in depth in future episodes, but for coherency sake I thought it best to try and get through all the other events before we start talking about the beginning of the 15 year war. The Japanese invasion immediately began influencing the KMT-CCP conflict. The Japanese invasion directly threatened Soviet interests and Moscow looked at the CCP as a potential bulwark against the Japanese. From 1930-1931, the CCP’s Red Army was successful in defending their territory against the NRA extermination campaigns, however they still suffered from a lack of discipline, supplies and professionalism. New leadership came from the new Central Committee, now led by the 28 Bolsheviks and a new comintern representative, Otto Braun. The Red Army began adopting a series of initiatives in 1932 to improve. All Red Army units were standardized to establish better command and control. Political indoctrination and military training also became standardized with waves upon waves of manuals distributed to the forces. The Red Army expanded the Red Academy by establishing the Red Army War College for mid-grade and senior officers. Branch schools and speciality schools to increase competency and training. Political mobilization remained cornerstone to the Red Army. Recruitment of new troops also began to see a renewed emphasis on urban proletariats. A large change to the operations for the Red Army was the adoption of Soviet offensive tactics to seek out decisive battles. CCP leaders were under the misbelief that revolutionary fervor would simply have the Red Army victory. What they lacked initially was professionalism, alongside good weaponry and equipment. Couple this with the NRA’s adoption of more and more effective counterinsurgency tactics, the Red Army really began to suffer terrible casualties. Now as the Red Army defeated the NRA in the third extermination campaign of 1931 not to be mistaken for the large third extermination campaign later, another intraparty power struggle was brewing in the CCP. After the fall of Li Lisan, a group of students returning from studies in the USSR began a systematic operation to gain control over the CCP. This group became known as the 28 Bolsheviks. 20 or some of them returned to China with the new Comintern adviser, Pavel Mif in 1931. Two key members of the group, Qin Bangxian known colloquially as Bo Gu, and Chen Shaoyu as Wang Ming would seize key positions at the top brass of the CCP. Many of these students attended Moscow’s Sun Yat-Sen University, where they became acquainted with Mif, the head rector of said university. This university was a breeding ground for ultra-orthodox Stalinist communist doctrine. It goes without saying the students were indoctrinated with a very Moscow perspective. Mif regarded them as a very well disciplined force and used them to purge out divergent groups within the university. During the third Plenum in September of 1930, Mif attempted to use the forum to denounce Li Lisans plan, but had failed to convince the majority of the Central Committee. After Li Lisan was condemned and recalled to Moscow, Mif saw a major opportunity. At the fourth Plenum in January of 1931, Li Lisan and 11 of his supported were ousted from the Central Committee, with their best positions seized by Moscow aligned CCP members. The next year, the 28 Bolsheviks unleashed a brutal intraparty war with other factions. By late September the Bolsheviks effectively destroyed most of the opposition and incorporated the surviving members into a the Central Committee loyal to Moscow. Bo Gu was appointed head of the Central Committee from Wang Ming who returned to Moscow. Once the 28 Bolsheviks were in control of the CCP at Shanghai, they then set their eyes upon Mao Zedong and the Red Army Soviet areas. During the first All-China Soviet Congress of November 1931, they launched their first attack. Mao Zedong received prior word of their intentions from loyal followers in Shanghai and prepared to face them. Before the Central Committee arrived at Ruijin, Mao had just emerged victorious from the encirclement campaigns, had suppressed dissension amongst his ranks and established a delegation of loyalists within the Soviet Congress. The Bolsheviks failed to gain a majority within the Congress, taking only 2 seats in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet. Meanwhile Zhu De was appointed Commissar of War and other Mao loyalists took high ranking positions. To try to break Mao Zedongs monopolistic control over the Red Army, the Bolsehviks employed Zhou Enlai.  In early 1932, the CCP urged the Red Army to expand Soviet territory as its forces grew. Successful defenses against encirclement Campaigns brought many NRA soldiers into the Red Army, some willingly, others by force. A key boost came on December 14, 1931, when the NRA’s Twenty-sixth Route Army rebelled and joined, forming the Fifth Red Army Corps. With this and other recruits, the First Front Red Army grew to about 70,000, requiring more territory to sustain itself and the revolution. On January 9th of 1932, the CCP Central Committee issued a resolution outlining a new strategy for the party and the Red Army. The resolution assessed the current situation in China, that of a major depression, the effects of the Mukden Incident and the string of CCP successes against the encirclement campaigns. The resolution reasserted the renewed commitment to recruit urban proletariats for the revolution and “expand the territory, link up the separated Soviet areas to form an integrated Soviet area, and take advantage of the present favorable political and military conditions to seize one or two important central cities so as to win an initial victory of the revolution in one or more provinces.” The Red Army would conduct a series of offensive to expand their Soviets and connect them starting in early 1932. They would target southern Jiangxi, such places as Ganzhou, Jiujiang, Nanchang and also Fujian’s Fuzhou, Xiamen and Zhangzhou. The resolution also pushed for a “positive and offensive line, rather than the luring of the enemy into the deep strategy, as it was no longer viable”. Furthermore the resolution directly attacked Mao Zedong's strategy as “being right opportunism that underestimated the situation and maintained a pessimistic attitude, and all party and army members should actively guard against its incorrect mindset”. This cemented the divide between the Bolshevik groups adoption of offensive strategy vs Mao Zedong’s defensive lure the enemy in deep strategy. The next operation would be against Ganzhou in Jiangxi. The city linked the Hunan-Jiangxi border areas with the Fujian-Jiangxi border areas and provided a nice launching point against Ji’an in the north. During another meeting in 1932 at Ruijin, Mao Zedong expressed his reservations about the operation, stating the Red Army did not have the necessary weapons or supplies to seize a major city. Zhu De backed him up, but the Central Military Committee vetoed them and continued planning the Ganzhou operation. On January 10th orders were handed out for the 1st, 3rd and 5th Red Army corps, along with the Jiangxi Soviet military regional forces to conduct the operation by February. On the other side, the KMT were well prepared to meet an attack against Ganzhou, they were also most likely tipped off.  On February 3rd of 1932 the Red Army arrived at Ganzhou quickly encircling the city. The next day the 5th Red Army Corps, roughly 20,000 men were the first to attack the city. They struck the East Gate, breaching the defenses slightly before being repelled. On the 17th and 23rd the Red Army forces conducted two major assaults, expanding the attacks to the West and South gates, but failed to gain a foothold. During the siege, two NRA brigades reinforced the Ganzhou garrison. Then on March 4th, the Red Army conducted a fourth major attack and was likewise repelled. Three days later the Red army retired to Jiangkou to reorganize after they had suffered 3000 casualties. Despite this the CCP leadership remained undeterred, believing the offensive strategy was still optimal. When Japan began rooting itself permanently in Manchuria, the CCP saw this as the perfect condition for a real revolution to take place. At a meeting on March 18th, Mao Zedong again argued his strategy fit the current conditions much more and that the offensive strategy was too ambiguous. Yet his arguments fell on deaf ears and the CCP leadership had the Red Army reorganized into two route armies. The west route army consisted of the 3rd army corps and was made responsible for expanding the Soviet areas west of the Gan River in Hunan-Jiangxi with a focus built around Zhuchuan, Taihe and Wan’an. The Central Route army consisted of the 1st and 5th Red army corps and would take Mao Zedong’s recommendations to perform expansion operations in south Fujian with Xiamen being the final target. On March 26th, the Central route red army occupied Changtin under Mao Zedongs guidance. There they conducted political mobilization of the local populace. Yet seeing little military action taking place, Zhou Enlai pushed Mao Zedong to stop the political mobilization and instead engage the enemy in the direction of Zhangzhou. Thus the Reds headed south and attacked the 49th NRA division. On April 10th the Reds managed to seize Longyan where they annihilated a single brigade of the 49th NRA division. The 5th NRA corps attempted to reinforce the 49th NRA division, but lost two brigades in the process. The Reds then continued marching south and on April 20th seized Zhangzhou where they defeated the 49th NRA division. At Zhangzhou they seized 1675 prisoners, 2000 rifles, some artillery pieces, 13,00 rounds of ammunition, two aircraft and over a million yuan. Alongside that came a lot of provisions, salt, oil and other goods needed to keep their men moving. After the success Mao Zedong telegrammed Zhou Enlai, requesting the Red army move back to Jiangxi with their booty to improve operations in the soviet area. It was Mao Zedong’s belief the Reds had made great gains at Zhangzhou but could not hold onto the area. Instead he wanted to expand operations in Fujian using smaller local militia and guerilla groups. The CCP yet again overruled Mao Zedong and on June 5th ordered him to keep up the offensive, now turning towards Guangdong military forces currently occupying southern Jiangxi.  Once that was completed they were to advance north up the Gan River Valley and attack Ganzhou, Zhangshu, Ji’an and Nanchang so as to foster a revolution in Jiangxi. The Red army then reorganized its forces placing the 1st, 3rd and 5th red army corps under the First Front Red Army who advanced into Guangdong. From late june into early July the Reds seized Shuikou, Nanxiong and defeated 15 Guangdong based NRA brigades and expanded the Soviet into the province. Yet even with the string of offensive victories, Mao Zedong still remained vocally in opposition towards the strategy, constantly submitting his recommendation to adjust their footing. On July 25th, Mao Zedong and Zhu De sent a joint communique to the CCP leadership requesting a change of strategy. They argued instead of immediately attacking Ji’an and Zhangshu they could perform clearing operation on the eastern part of the valley, focusing on Yihaung and Le’an. The CCP central committee was initially against the proposals, however Zhou Enlai intervened and gave his support to them. In August the 1st front red army held a conference and confirmed they would attack Yihaung and Le’an. They took Le’an shortly after, defeating the 27th NRA division. With that victory they gained 5000 prisoners, 4000 rifles, 20 machine guns, 20 artillery pieces and 3 wireless communication sets. Afterwards the Reds contemplated attacking Ji’an, however after consideration Mao Zedong argued on September 25th, the NRA presence at Ji’an was too strong. He instead recommended they conduct political mobilization operations around the Le’an Yihuang area. By this point the CCP Central Committee was really pissed off with what they considered insubordination from Mao Zedong. By this time the 28th Bolsheviks had gained enough power and began striping Mao Zedong of key positions with the Red Army. First he was removed from the Military Committee of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas. Have I mentioned how much communists love making endless committees? Later in October of 1933 an emergency conference was held at Ningdu to plan future operations on the eve of an impending KMT campaign. Participants included Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen yi, Liu Bocheng and Peng Dehuai who all agreed they should take up offensive actions outside the Soviet. Alongside this the party condemned Mao Zedongs strategy called it inadequate and outdated. Zhou Enlai then argued for “expanding Soviet territory swiftly, engaging the enemy on KMT territory, bringing Jiangxi and its neighboring Soviet areas together by force, taking key cities in the Gan valley, including Nanchang, Ji’an, Ganzhou, and Pingxiang, so as to achieve preliminary successes in one or more provinces.” After the Ningdu conference, the Red Army continued with the offensive operation, now attacking Jianning, Lichuan and Taining in October. By November the 1st front army took the Jiangxi county seats of Zixi and Jinxi. This helped the CCP expand the Soviet in the eastern Gan valley, but it also placed them on a vulnerable footing, just in time for the KMT’s 4th major encirclement campaign. During the CCP’s expansion activities, the KMT had been performing a communist suppression campaign in Shanghai, driving out the Bolsheviks and other CCP members towards the Jiangxi Soviet by late 1932. Their arrival to the Jiangxi Soviet added further tension to the Red Army who were facing a new encirclement campaign. The presence of high ranking Central Committee members also changed their politics. The Mao Zedong adapted Marxist-Leninist theory was replaced by more orthodox and Moscow leaning theory. Many of 28 Bolsheviks moved to many Soviets sparking a new phase.  Before the start of the 4th major encirclement campaign, the Red Army from the Jiangxi Soviet conducted expansion operations into Fujian and Guangdong. Other Red army units performed similar operations in Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan. All of this red activity was enough to push Chiang Kai-Shek to refocus his military operations against them. On April 9th, 1932, Chiang Kai-Shek created the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Wuhan with He Yingqin as its commander. Beginning in June 1932 He Yingqin had a force of 500,000 soldiers who unleashed a brutal encirclement and suppression campaign against the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and western Hubei-Hunan Soviet areas. By November of 1932, both soviets collapsed. After this Chiang Kai-Shek ordered He Yingqin to direct his efforts against the Jiangxi Soviet. In December Chiang Kai-Shek shifted over 400,000 troops and 30 divisions to the Central Soviet Operation. He even personally moved down to Nanchang to supervise the operation. The main forces consisted of 3 columns, roughly 150,000 troops in 12 divisions led by Chen Cheng. The KMT plan was to build a series of blockhouses as a means of economically blockading the Soviet. Around 240,000 troops were allocated for the blockade, in addition to the main force which brought the entire figure to 400,000 men. Each flank of the blockade had 70,000 troops, roughly 6 divisions who would conduct blocking operations in the Jiangxi-Guangdong border area and the Fujian-Jiangxi border area. Around 100,000 would be used to conduct anti-guerilla operations in the northwest and northeast of Jiangxi as well as in southeast Hunan and southwest Jiangxi. Was the blockade was set, the NRA would deploy 3 columns along separate routes converging upon the Red Army's rear for a concentrated attack. Over on the other side, the Red Army based near Lichuan had roughly 70,000 men from the 1st, 3rd and 5th Red army corps and the 11th,12th, 21st and 22nd Red Armies. The 4th encirclement campaign coincided with the Red Army’s urban offensives. By December of 1932 the Reds had targeted Nancheng. The Central Committee issued the attack orders but due to the large NRA reinforcement efforts had to order the Red Army to withdraw from the outskirts of Nancheng. The next potential target was Nanfeng. The Central Committee again pushed for urban offensive as Nanfeng was attacked beginning in February of 1933. On February 7th the Red Army besieged the city. The NRA quickly dispatched the Central Route Army to reinforce the city and conduct a counterattack. Seeing the large concentration of NRA in the area, on February 13th Zhou Enlai ordered the forces to pull out and head over to Luokou.  The Red Army set up a diversion to cover their withdrawal. Using similar tactics employed during the third encirclement campaign, the 11th Red Army pretended to be the main force and suddenly attacked Lichuan. The NRA took the bait immediately sending 3 columns to Lichuan. While marching the 1st NRA column’s 52nd and 59th NRA division became separated. On February 25th the two divisions moved west towards Huangpi along two routes separated by a mountain ridge. As they did so, their distance from the NRA 2nd and 3rd columns increased making mutual support efforts impossible. On the 27th the 1st and 3rd Red Army corps and 21st Red army unleashed a surprise attack against the 52nd NRA division. The next day the 5th Red army corps and 22nd red army attack the 59th NRA division around Huangpi. The division was annihilated with its commander captured. After the victory the Red Army pulled back to Luokou.  After the loss the NRA reorganized its force into 2 columns and changed strategy. Now instead of heading in 3 wide columns they would concentrate as 2 down the center of the Soviet. On March 16th, the two NRA columns began their advance as the Reds deployed their 11th army to perform more deception operations. The 11th Red army made a feint towards Guangchang, attracting the NRA front column. This action separated the two columns by 50 kms and isolated the 11th NRA division near Caotaigang. On March the 20th the 1st front red army attacked the 11th NRA division near Xuzhuang decimating them and severely defeating the 9th NRA division. For the remainder of the 4th encirclement campaign there were no other major battles. During March of 1933 the Reds conducted political operations near Le’an until NRA forces moved there to secure the city.  In April the NRA began to withdraw from the Jiangxi Soviet area, effectively ending their encirclement campaign. The NRA had suffered considerable losses for their efforts. They had lost the equivalent of 3 divisions; over 10,000 prisoners were taken. The Reds and seized 10,000 rifles, 300 German made machine guns and 40 artillery pieces. Another consequence of the failed encirclement campaign was the validation of the Bolshevik led offensive strategy. The CCP then adopted a series of reform measures hoping the Red Army could seize large cities. First the CCP attempted to expand the Red Army’s overall strength by launching a large recruitment drive. In addition they incorporated all the local militias in the main Red Army. To fund the expansion the CCP adopted a large land distribution policy to generate revenue. Under the guise of performing a land investigation the CCP distributed 80% of the land within the soviet area. During the distribution the CCP attempted to raise nearly one million yuan. During the summer of 1933 the CCP also focused on suppressing counterrevolutionaries. One of the 28 Bolsheviks greatest critics was Luo Ming, the secretary of the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi soviet committee. A large amount of recruitment and taxation had hurt the morale of the local people in the Soviet. When the Central Committee wanted troops there to deploy for action Luo Ming argued they needed to stay for local defense and that they should scale back offensive operations. However from the perspective of the 28 Bolsheviks it looked very similar to Mao Zedongs lure the enemy in deep strategy. At this point there were still many loyal to Mao Zedong and his strategy, so the Bolsheviks saw an opportunity to hurt him through punishing Luo Ming. They created a new pejorative term “Luo Min Line” to describe any non-offensive strategy and began a purge of the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Soviets leadership. The “Luo Ming line” became a new slogan to describe any in the CCP opposing the offensive strategy. During the summer of 1933, the Central Committee, emboldened by surviving the fourth encirclement campaign, continued to press on with their offensive strategy. With the Bolshviks and Otto Braun, the Jiangxi Soviet increased the central oversight over the Red Army and gradually seized direct control over military matters. On May 8th, the CCP passed a resolution separating the Central Military council and the Red Army leadership. Zhu De and Zhou Enlai remained in charge of the Red Army, but Bo Gu gained greater control over the military council and now controlled the Red Army's strategy and the employment of its military. Also Otto Braun would play a much larger role in military strategy, leveraging his experience at the Frunze Academy to push for offensive action.  The Red Army also reorganized its units to facilitate the execution of the new offensive strategies. In June the CCP divided the 1st front red army into the eastern front red army and central red army. Bo Gu and Braun believed that the Red Army had grown strong enough, both in firepower and manpower, to no longer require coordinated, mutually supportive operations. Instead, they felt the Red Army units could carry out independent operations in different regions. The Eastern Front Red Army, composed of the Third Red Army Corps, was stationed in western Fujian, while the Central Red Army, formed from the First Red Army Corps, remained in the Central Soviet area. Under the guidance of the new Central Military Committee, the Eastern Front Red Army launched expansion efforts into Fujian after the NRA vacated the region. Peng Dehuai's forces embarked on a three-month campaign in Fujian, expanding Soviet-controlled territory, securing supplies—especially salt—and raising funds, addressing key shortages for both the Red Army and the CCP. Before the Fifth Extermination Campaign, the Central Soviet controlled an impressive 60,000 square kilometers, spanning parts of three provinces. However, as they focused on territorial expansion, the Red Army neglected to monitor the KMT, which was preparing for another encirclement campaign. Now we have primarily focused on one of the major Soviets implicated in the fourth encirclement campaign. In reality the fourth encirclement campaign had been a large scale operation against three major soviets: the Hunan-Western Hubei Soviet also referred to as the Honghu Soviet; the Hubei-Henan-Anhui or Eyuwan Soviet and the Jiangxi Soviet. You would be led to believe and rightfully so because many lets just say, CCP aligned sources like to highlight the Jiangxi Soviet story, that the communists had kind of duped the NRA and stolen their victory from them. It was much more of a mixed bag overall. The campaign against the Hunan–Western Hubei Soviet saw the NRA successfully defeat the local Red Army forces, overrunning their main base in southern Hubei and Hunan. The majority of the fighting occurred around Jingzhou and overall was seen as a loss for the CCP. For the campaign against the Eyuwan Soviet, drought, famine and epidemics severely hurt the CCP forces in 1932. Between July and September, Chiang Kai-Shek had allocated more than 300,000 troops for the operation. The CCP suffered tremendously because of the numerical superiority of the NRA. The NRA General Xia Douyin unleashed a scorched earth campaign, killing countless, burning many villages and destroying to seizing crops. Historians like Chen Yaohuang argue the fourth Red Army who participated in this area were defeated largely because they had adopted conventional warfare tactics. The peasantry were very hostile to the NRA, forcing their forces to depend on unreliable local elites for provisions, creating a very vulnerable supply line. However the CCP failed to exploit this weakness by not committing guerilla warfare. Despite the NRA victory, it was a rather incomplete one and they ended their campaign prematurely celebrating. The fourth red army had successfully retreated into the border region between Shaanxi and Sichuan leaving behind a small force to conduct guerilla warfare. The remaining Communist forces in the Eyuwan Soviet, led by Gao Jingting and Xu Haidong, capitalized on the early Nationalist withdrawal to rebuild a guerrilla movement. They hid in the mountains, survived by foraging, and organized poor peasants to seize grain from landlords and public granaries. The 25th Red Army, under their leadership, managed to maintain a Communist presence in the region for several more years. After all was said and done, as was the case with the previous encirclement campaigns, reports from field commanders were far too optimistic. Many reported to Chiang Kai-Shek exaggerated numbers of casualties inflicted, prisoners taken and areas secured. In reality what the communists were doing was simply moving around to give off the impression of major defeats. Sure the Reds were taken enormous losses, but they were constantly recruiting and spreading. They could probably sustain these yearly encirclement campaigns if the NRA did not do something much more bold…like actually encircle the Reds. As great as the Reds were becoming at outwitting their opponent, their luck would eventually run out. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Reds had survived 4 large encirclement campaigns. The 28 Bolsheviks and their moscow allies were greatly emboldened thinking it was their time to go on the offensive and usher in a true revolution. However those like Mao Zedong knew the dire reality of the situation and were bracing themselves for the coming storm.