4: 3. US Intelligence Successes vs. Policy Failures Leading to the 2022 Invasion. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) details the period leading to the February 2022 i

3. US Intelligence Successes vs. Policy Failures Leading to the 2022 Invasion. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) details the period leading to the February 2022 invasion, where Russia positioned troops along the border, while the Biden administration publicly ruled out sending US troops or weapons to Ukraine. This policy is identified as a "colossal misjudgment" of Putin. Although US intelligence successfully reported Kremlin war plans almost in real time, hoping to deter Putin, little was done to militarily strengthen Ukraine. The prevailing Western assessment—that Kyiv would fall quickly and Ukraine would be overrun within a week—was based on a massive miscalculation that underestimated the Ukrainian military and people's resolve. Vladimir Putin framed the war using historical claims, stating that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people." This belief, rooted in 19th-century Russian imperial ideas, led to the flawed expectation that 150,000 to 200,000 troops would be sufficient and that Ukrainians would welcome them. Putin's central aim, consistent since the 2014 war, remains stopping Ukraine's Western drift and forcing it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. The countdown to the current war began after President Zelensky, who was an unlikely war leader elected in 2019, refused to implement the Minsk agreements according to Putin's destabilizing agenda during their meeting in Paris in December 2019.