32 - An F-Inductive Argument for Panpsychism

I would like to introduce what may be a new argument, the f-inductive argument from consciousness for panpsychism.  Panpsychism entails the existence of consciousness, whereas most competing views do not. The evidence—consciousness, in this case—is not surprising on the hypothesis of panpsychism, but is surprising on the hypothesis of physicalism, as well as many of panpsychism’s rivals. The probability that consciousness would exist on panpsychism isn’t just high—it’s 1. The probability that we would find this evidence in a physicalist universe is less than that. In fact, it’s unexpected. So other evidence held equal, panpsychism has a notable edge here. Jeffery Jay Lowder | F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument [Patheos] Jeffery Jay Lowder | An F-Inductive Argument from Consciousness for Theism, Revisited [Patheos] Transcripts available at emersongreenblog.wordpress.com My Discord Rate the show on iTunes here Support on Patreon here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube here Contact me at [email protected] or on Facebook Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism / / /  Let B=background information or evidence; E=the evidence to be explained; H=an explanatory hypothesis; Pr(|H|)=the intrinsic probability of H; and Pr(x|y)=the epistemic probability of x conditional upon y. C-inductive:  Pr(H | E & B) > P(H | B) F-inductive:  Pr(E | H2 & B) > Pr(E | H1 & B) P-inductive:  Pr(H | E & B) > ½ Here is the F-inductive argument from consciousness for panpsychism: Let E in this case be consciousness. (1) E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is 1. (2) Panpsychism is not intrinsically much less probable than Physicalism, i.e., Pr(|Panpsychism|) is not much less than Pr(|Physicalism|). (3) Pr(E | Panpsychism & B) > Pr(E | Physicalism & B). (4) Therefore, other evidence held equal, Panpsychism is probably true. Pr(Panpsychism | B & E) > 0.5.