66 - Wittgensteinian View of Concepts (The Failure of Analysis)

Today, we discuss the idea that understanding a concept is not a matter of knowing a definition. As philosopher Michael Huemer argues, our main access to a concept comes “not through directly reflecting on the concept, but through activating the dispositions that constitute our understanding.”  The Wittgensteinian view of concepts explains how it’s possible that we know how to competently use terms even though it is so hard to successfully analyze them. I can’t provide a perfect conceptual analysis of knowledge (no one can), and yet I have no issue using the term and understanding what it means. Not only can I competently use words that I can’t analyze, I can reject proposed analyses as insufficient, like the justified true belief analysis. That’s because I understand the meaning of the concept, despite the fact that I can’t define it.  “Indefinability of words is perfectly normal," Huemer argues, "since understanding is not constituted by knowledge of definitions. The best way to convey a word’s meaning is through examples.”  Language & Meaning: Crash Course Philosophy Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer Linktree One note from Huemer on the Wittgensteinian view of concepts and the contrasting Lockean view: "I think what I have to say about concepts is like some stuff that Wittgenstein said, but I don’t actually care how well it matches Wittgenstein’s views. I also don’t care, by the way, whether the 'Lockean theory' matches Locke’s views. You have to add in caveats like this whenever you mention a major philosophical figure, because there are always people who have devoted their lives to studying that figure and who, if you let them, will give you all sorts of arguments that the famous philosopher has been completely misunderstood and never really said the things they’re famous for saying."